The Korean War highlighted two challenges facing the Voice of America (VOA), the US government's international broadcasting agency, which the State Department then operated. As interpreter to the world of American foreign policy and news, the VOA treated the war as an opportunity to emphasize the US's commitment to preventing the spread of communism. Yet the conflict also put the premiere American propaganda agency on the defensive. While the VOA declared America to be on the true side of freedom and peace, the Soviet Union vigorously denounced the US for its segregation of and violence against African Americans. How could America be fighting for freedom in Korea when it denied this basic right to millions of its own citizens?, Soviet propaganda asked. The Soviets also pointed to America's second class treatment of blacks as evidence that the nation now waged a race war against Asians.

    In order to rebut Soviet charges and support US aims in Korea, the VOA perfected an approach it had already developed for coverage of domestic race relations, a method that fits the definition of “tokenism.” After a usually hasty admission that black Americans had not yet attained equality, the VOA either asserted that because the US was a democracy, this inequity was fast dwindling, or else it dwelled on the achievements of famous and anti-communist black Americans. During the Korean War, for example, Nobel Peace Prize winner Ralph Bunche and Edith Sampson, a member of the US delegation to the UN, were practically fixtures in VOA news. Presumably, VOA news or features about the accomplishments of Bunche and Sampson, or about the feats of black sports figures and combat troops, showed that the US was making steady progress toward ending the oppression and mistreatment of African Americans. The VOA then supported these assertions with coverage of black Americans' commitment to democracy and their opposition to communism.

    In describing how the VOA, in its news, tried to erase America's color line, I will demonstrate the effects of propaganda on the creators rather than the usual subject, the audience. By claiming that the end of racism was near, information policymakers for the VOA and the State Department exaggerated actual conditions, then realized that they could enhance this narrative's persuasiveness by appointing black Americans to highly visible public relations posts abroad. To put it bluntly, the State Department undertook partial desegregation for self-serving rather than altruistic reasons. However, this hiring initiative did not originate entirely within the State Department. The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) pushed the State Department to hire blacks in order to demonstrate both its commitment to anti-communism and to integrate an important department of the federal government.
 
    The VOA's strategy of tokenism preceded the Korean War, but first, let me provide brief background information. The VOA debuted in February 1942; later that year, President Franklin Roosevelt moved it into the Office of War Information (OWI). Congressional conservatives lambasted the OWI and VOA for wasting money, encroaching into the domain of private media, and promoting the domestic policies of the administration.  Such complaints followed the VOA out of the war. In August 1945, President Truman abolished the OWI, but transferred the VOA to the State Department, declaring that international information activities were an important part of America's postwar foreign relations. Congressional opponents, primarily Republicans and Southern Democrats, did not agree, and they led efforts to strip the VOA of operating funds and block the passage of enabling legislation. In spring 1947, the Republican-controlled 80th Congress had nearly succeeded in silencing the VOA when the incipient Cold War intervened. Supporters of the VOA connected the radio agency to the military and economic aid package for Greece and Turkey and the Marshall Plan, and the VOA remained on the air.

    The strategy of tokenism developed during these three years of uncertain existence and the coalescence of containment. Because the VOA faced imminent demise between 1945 and 1947, policymakers and administrators were eager to avoid controversial topics that might stir anger in Congress. Race relations was just such a topic, especially since many southern Democrats occupied key positions on the House's and Senate's Appropriations and Rules Committees. Moreover, the State Department, an exclusively white bastion, showed little interest in whether or not the VOA provided news coverage of the treatment of black Americans. In October 1945, prominent mass communications scholar Harold Lasswell wrote a report for Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs William Benton, the official responsible for the VOA. Lasswell suggested that since the "Russians have the reputation of being remarkably free of race prejudice," the State Department's information programs needed to emphasize the progress made in race relations within the US. The memorandum was marked discard.  If the State Department was not yet concerned about coverage of race relations and African Americans, others were. In early 1946, the Committee of the National Non-Partisan Council on Public Affairs, which represented several black organizations including the NAACP, expressed interest in the State Department's information and cultural programs. Accordingly, a State Department official met with the Committee to assure them that "all phases of American culture" were represented, and that the Department was committed to the fair employment of all Americans in its personnel.

    However, it took Soviet interest in US race relations to firmly fix information policymakers' attention on the issue. In February 1947, a State Department report noted that Soviet international information programs were portraying the US in highly negative ways, including emphasis on "racial discrimination and oppression, particularly of Negroes."  Since the VOA was preparing to begin broadcasts to the Soviet Union, it wanted to put the best foot forward. At the same time, policy directives mandated that VOA broadcasts adhere to the journalistic principles of fairness and objectivity. Walter Bedell Smith, the US Ambassador to the Soviet Union, noted the tension between these two aims in an evaluation he provided of an early Voice Russia broadcast: "Embassy assumes that items on strikes and lynching were included to demonstrate objectivity and frankness of broadcast . . .." However, Smith continued, such treatment reinforced the claims of Soviet propaganda, and so such "unfavorable items" should be avoided unless there was specific purpose for including them.  In his reply, Secretary of State George Marshall indicated that future broadcasts would keep such items "to [a] minimum consistent with [the] principle of objectivity."

    Soon, however, the practice of emphasizing progress over problems in domestic race relations was laid out, with Bedell Smith exercising much influence. Referring to news about a lynching in the US, Bedell Smith suggested that attention should not be given to the details of the crime itself, but rather, "what as a democracy we are trying to do about our problems . . .."  After the VOA reported that singer Paul Robeson was setting his music career aside to fight racial discrimination, Bedell Smith stressed again that such items should only be used in "general discussion" of what the nation was doing to end racism.  Following Bedell Smith's suggestions, emphasis on improvements made rather than historic and contemporary problems became standard practice in VOA news during 1947. For example, policymakers rejected a proposed Russian language series on race problems in the US.  In October 1947, the VOA received special guidance on the President's Commission on Civil Rights report To Secure These Rights a week before its release date. The report described in detail the discrimination faced by black Americans and the substantial need for federal action to guarantee the civil rights of all. The VOA was instructed, however, to treat briefly and in summary form the report's "recognition of short-comings," and to emphasize that such problems were small in proportion to the progress already made.

    During the next two years, the VOA sought to substantiate its claims of progress through news about black Americans who had broken past the color line. In December 1948, VOA guidance suggested that desks report the selection of Congressman William L. Dawson (D-IL) to chair the House's Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments.  In order to facilitate similar reporting, the VOA requested placement on the NAACP's mailing list for all press and radio releases. The VOA also asked for a national list of black members of state legislatures, district attorneys, and city council members.  In February 1949, a status report on the VOA noted that whenever possible, "news and feature shows include Negroes in the mention of any racial groups to illustrate, without emphasizing, their prominence in American life." However, this prominence did not extend to the VOA itself—the use of black broadcasters was considered "too obvious for top effectiveness as counter-propaganda."  As demonstrated by these developments and statements, the VOA's attention was now fixed almost exclusively on the task of finding token or exaggerated evidence that racial discrimination was waning in the US.

    In this way, the VOA's reporting complemented other on-going efforts to downplay racism in the US, including Edith Sampson's participation in a world tour sponsored by the radio show "America's Town Meeting of the Air." While visiting India in 1949, Sampson said that white Americans were "going to clear up their own backyard" after learning that racial discrimination at home was ruining their credibility abroad. Such optimistic claims brought Sampson to the attention of State Department official Chester Williams, who, along with Congressman William Dawson and Truman adviser India Edwards, recommended that Sampson be appointed to the US delegation to the UN. She was.

    In 1950, the VOA stepped up its efforts to prove racism's demise in the US. In September 1950, all the VOA's language desks reported that Ralph Bunche had received the Nobel Peace Prize.  Certainly Bunche's award was newsworthy by any standards, but the VOA's continuing coverage of Bunche lingered on his race and his commitment to anti-communism. VOA guidance reminded all desks to point out that Bunche was the first black to receive the prestigious award.  Commentary by Bunche supporting US goals in Korea received coverage in a VOA program that began, "[t]he well-known American negro Ralph Bunche."  In August 1951, the VOA's India desk aired a five minute feature on Bunche's life, and during the next two years, the feature ran on other VOA desks as well.  VOA coverage of Edith Sampson also emphasized her race and commitment to anti-communism. To China the VOA broadcast a feature entitled, "Edith Sampson, Negro Lawyer."  After Sampson's appointment to the US delegation to the UN, the VOA tracked her work at that post.  In January 1951, the VOA informed its Yugoslavian listeners that Sampson had urged educational aid for Asia in order to combat communism.  Sampson and Bunche were not the only famous black Americans who turned up in VOA news, either. In September 1950, the VOA told Czechoslovakia that Duke Ellington had refused to sign the Stockholm petition, also known as the World Peace Appeal of 1950, which had originated in the Soviet satellite nations in Eastern Europe.  Boxer Sugar Ray Robinson's fights and his tour of Europe received coverage in broadcasts to Finland and Italy, and the VOA interviewed publisher John H. Johnson for its English program in a piece dubbed, "America's foremost Negro Publisher."

    The VOA also confronted Soviet claims that in Korea, the US was waging a war against people of color. Information policymakers regarded the participation of black combat troops as effective counter-propaganda, but only if the VOA followed careful guidelines. (Despite President Truman's 1948 executive order desegregating the armed forces, all-black units remained within the army, which vigorously resisted the order).   Since emphasis on black American units might remind listeners of this lingering segregation, guidance in July 1950 instructed the VOA to concentrate on stories of individual heroism and integrated units. Further guidance reiterated the heroic story line, also instructing the VOA to ignore Soviet charges that the US was using its black troops as cannon fodder.  Information policymakers were not the only ones who recognized the propaganda potential of black combatants in Korea. Hope Easton, an Associate Editor at Reader's Digest, suggested to Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs Edward W. Barrett that the VOA focus on black air force pilots in Korea. Barrett assured Easton that the VOA was already extensively covering this topic.  In October 1951, the VOA reported to its Arab listeners that the Army had disbanded the 24th Infantry Regiment, one of the remaining all-black units, and integrated its members with other units.

    By early 1952, the VOA had made tokenism a regular part of its broadcasts. According to an internal check on VOA broadcasts, "at least once every three days Negro achievements and personalities are mentioned in our Americana Roundup circulated in all language desks." Examples included news about a film on Jackie Robinson, a profile on Edith Sampson, and a report on the national awards given to Ralph Bunche. Whenever possible, VOA broadcasts also described progress in ending segregation. With regard to the cultural achievements of Black Americans, the VOA featured writers and singers, though it mentioned the race of the subject "only when thsis [sic] is essential for purposes of clarity."

    While this sanguine picture of American race relations went out to the world over the VOA's airwaves, the VOA's parent agency, the Office of Public Affairs, sought to tighten its connections with various black organizations, including the NAACP. Like the VOA's optimistic broadcasts, these attempts preceded the Korean War but took on added urgency after the outbreak of hostilities. In March 1950, after noting that the State Department did not yet have adequate contact with black Americans, Public Affairs suggested that "careful consideration to qualified talent in the Negro communities" should be given for appointments to advisory committees and US delegations to international conferences. Public Affairs also proposed that additional efforts be made to consult black organizations for program guidance and make Department officials available for speaking engagements before these groups.  Soon after the circulation of these proposals, the head of the Office of Public Affairs asked Arthur Spingarn, the President of the NAACP, to attend a State Department Conference entitled, "The US in World Affairs." The State Department also invited the NAACP to roundtable discussions of the Department's information and cultural programs.

    Plans to hire black Public Affairs officers unfolded soon after the State Department established contact with the NAACP. In July 1950, a member of the General Manager's office within Public Affairs suggested adding a black journalist to its staff in order to counter communist propaganda about American racism.  That fall, Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs Edward Barrett approved such a move, indicating that he wanted to "recruit two or three very bright and personable colored youngsters to do regular jobs in our field in missions overseas—particularly missions where we're subjected to racial propaganda. If this works out, we might go in for it more extensively in the future."  Personnel directors were already ahead of Barrett. Recruitment at black universities such as Howard and Wilberforce was underway, though at that point, these efforts had only found candidates to fill clerical positions.  Essentially, the tokenism that existed in the VOA's broadcasts was now taking shape in the flesh. Black candidates were attractive not for their qualifications, but rather, for their usefulness as living counter-propaganda. "[I]n Greece there appears to be no awareness of the American color problem and no need for a Negro officer as such," reported a member of the General Manager's office in early 1951.

    At the same time, the NAACP began exerting pressure on the State Department to add blacks to their ranks. In March 1951, Walter White, the NAACP's Executive Secretary, sent to Barrett a letter of introduction for a black job candidate.  Reviewing a packet of State Department propaganda, NAACP Washington Bureau Director Clarence Mitchell reported to White that "colored people do not appear in the pictures because there has been a conscious effort to omit them." Mitchell concluded that the State Department needed to add blacks to its publications office.  After attending a State Department Conference on Foreign Policy, Roy Wilkins recommended to White "that we should do whatever we can to get a qualified colored person or persons on Mr. Barrett's staff . . .."  The NAACP's efforts brought results. In June, the report to the Board of Directors indicated that several black individuals had applied for positions with the State Department. One applicant was even hired after the NAACP met with Secretary of State Dean Acheson to discuss the applicant's qualifications. In June 1952, White thanked Acheson for hiring Dr. John A. Davis, a professor at Lincoln University, as a consultant for minority employment.

    Under the leadership of White, the NAACP was interested in more than boosting the number of black Foreign Service Officers. It also wanted to demonstrate its continuing commitment to anti-communism. The NAACP's approval of anti-communist policies constituted a quid pro quo for both the Truman administration, which desired broad-based support for these policies, and the NAACP, which sought a stronger dedication to civil rights on the part of the President. Accordingly, the NAACP approved of the Marshall Plan and NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) despite the opposition of some branches and members.  Such cooperation on the part of the national NAACP continued through the Korean War. In November 1951, the NAACP responded positively to the State Department's request to rebut We Charge Genocide, the report of the Civil Rights Congress, a communist-front organization. While Walter White noted to a State Department official that many of the report's facts were true, he also expressed concern that the report would be used worldwide to disparage American democracy.  In January 1952, White arranged a meeting with Acheson to discuss, among other items, revision of White's recent article in the Saturday Review of Literature, which White hoped "will do some good in answering Communist propaganda."

    By March 1953, three months before an armistice brought the Korean War to an end, the collaboration between the NAACP and the State Department had met the aims of both institutions. Fifty-five black Americans had found employment within the Foreign Service; many others worked in clerical positions. Consistent with the strategy of tokenism developed by the VOA beginning in 1947, most of these individuals worked in public affairs positions such as broadcast writers and information program planners, or else in areas of the world where the US had a reputation for racism: India, Africa, Southeast Asia.  For the NAACP, the State Department's eagerness to support its claims that American racism was dwindling gave the venerable but oft-attacked organization an opportunity to assert its dedication to democracy and its firm stance against communism while also pushing the State Department to integrate its ranks.

    What should we make both of tokenism and the NAACP's part in fostering it? Clearly, race in America confronted the VOA with a pressing credibility problem vis-a-vis the dissemination of American Cold War aims. As explained, the VOA's depiction of racial equality in America prompted efforts to extend the illusion from the airwaves to the libraries and cultural centers maintained abroad by the State Department. In effect, the propagandists were taken in by their own output. What began in early 1947 as an effort to strike a delicate balance between admitting problems while emphasizing progress had, by the time of the Korean War, evolved into a full-fledged offensive to show—first on the air, and then in person as well—only happy, successful, patriotic African Americans. Black public relations officers supposedly stood as proof of US racial equality. To be sure, the State Department now had more black employees than ever before, but an irony is still apparent. The State Department did not undertake desegregation because it was the democratic thing to do, but rather, because the Department needed to project abroad  the appearance of democracy succeeding at home.

    With regard to the NAACP, its cooperation with the State Department's efforts to place black foreign service officers in highly visible but limited public affairs posts suggests that whatever their intentions, White, Wilkins, and Mitchell let themselves and the NAACP be co-opted by the State Department, which was not genuinely interested in integrating its ranks. Such an interpretation would seem to support Gerald Horne's argument that the NAACP's post World War II eagerness to prove its anti-communism undermined rather than served its constituency.  To characterize the NAACP's national directorate as dupes is, however, too harsh an evaluation. As Helen Laville and Scott Lucas have recently argued, the NAACP's anti-communism did not necessarily make the organization "a lackey for the government" since it continued criticizing American policy on colonialism and race relations.  If we condemn the NAACP for being too eager to please the State Department's Office of Public Affairs, we must also remember that the Office of Public Affairs was eager to please the NAACP. How many organizations, for example, received a personal audience with the Secretary of State to discuss an applicant, as the NAACP did? Yet it does seem fair, considering the evidence presented, to offer the counterfactual suggestion that the NAACP could have pushed the State Department to extend its hiring of blacks beyond token public affairs positions. In this sense, the NAACP failed to capitalize on an available opportunity.  Another irony thus emerges. While anti-communism led the State Department to partially desegregate, the desire to demonstrate its own brand of anti-communism led the NAACP to stop short of prodding the State Department to do more.