Pro. I think that what Socrates is now saying is excellent, Philebus. 

     Phi. I think so too, but how do his words bear upon us and upon 
the argument? 

     Soc. Philebus is right in asking that question of us, Protarchus. 

     Pro. Indeed he is, and you must answer him. 

     Soc. I will; but you must let me make one little remark first 
about these matters; I was saying, that he who begins with any 
individual unity, should proceed from that, not to infinity, but to a 
definite number, and now I say conversely, that he who has to begin
with infinity should not jump to unity, but he should look about for 
some number,representing a certain quantity, and thus out of all end in 
one. And now let us return for an illustration of our principle to the 
case of letters. 

     Pro. What do you mean? 

     Soc. Some god or divine man, who in the Egyptian legend is said to 
have been Theuth, observing that the human voice was infinite, first 
distinguished in this infinity a certain number of vowels, and then 
other letters which had sound, but were not pure vowels (i.e., the 
semivowels); these too exist in a definite number; and lastly, he
 distinguished a third class of letters which we now call mutes, 
without voice and without sound, and divided these, and likewise the 
two other classes of vowels and semivowels, into the individual sounds, 
told the number of them, and gave to each and all of them the name of 
letters; and observing that none of us could learn any one of
them and not learn them all, and in consideration of this common bond 
which in a manner united them, he assigned to them all a single art, 
and this he called the art of grammar or letters. 

     Phi. The illustration, Protarchus, has assisted me in 
understanding the original statement, but I still feel the defect of 
which I just now complained. 

     Soc. Are you going to ask, Philebus, what this has to do with the 
argument? 

     Phi. Yes, that is a question which Protarchus and I have been long 
asking. 

     Soc. Assuredly you have already arrived at the answer to the 
question which, as you say, you have been so long asking? 

     Phi. How so? 

     Soc. Did we not begin by enquiring into the comparative 
eligibility of pleasure and wisdom? 

     Phi. Certainly. 

     Soc. And we maintain that they are each of them one? 

     Phi. True. 

     Soc. And the precise question to which the previous discussion 
desires an answer is, how they are one and also many [i.e., how they 
have one genus and many species], and are not at once infinite, and 
what number of species is to be assigned to either of them before they 
pass into infinity. 

     Pro. That is a very serious question, Philebus, to which Socrates 
has ingeniously brought us round, and please to consider which of us 
shall answer him; there may be something ridiculous in my being unable 
to answer, and therefore imposing the task upon you, when I have 
undertaken the whole charge of the argument, but if neither of us were 
able to answer, the result methinks would be still more ridiculous. Let 
us consider, then, what we are to do:-Socrates, if I understood him 
rightly, is asking whether there are not kinds of pleasure, and what is 
the number and nature of them, and the same of wisdom. 

     Soc. Most true, O son of Callias; and the previous argument showed 
that if we are not able to tell the kinds of everything that has unity, 
likeness, sameness, or their opposites, none of us will be of the smallest 
use in any enquiry. 

Pro. That seems to be very near the truth, Socrates. Happy would the 
wise man be if he knew all things, and the next best thing for him is 
that he should know himself. Why do I say so at this moment? I will 
tell you. You, Socrates, have granted us this opportunity of conversing 
with you, and are ready to assist us in determining what is the best 
of human goods. For when Philebus said that pleasure and delight and
enjoyment and the like were the chief good, you answered-No, not those, 
but another class of goods; and we are constantly reminding ourselves 
of what you said, and very properly, in order that we may not forget to 
examine and compare the two. And these goods, which in your opinion are 
to be designated as superior to pleasure, and are the true objects of 
pursuit, are mind and knowledge and understanding and art and the
like. There was a dispute about which were the best, and we playfully 
threatened that you should not be allowed to go home until the question 
was settled; and you agreed, and placed yourself at our disposal. And 
now, as children say, what has been fairly given cannot be taken back; 
cease then to fight against us in this way. 

     Soc. In what way? 

     Phi. Do not perplex us, and keep asking questions of us to which 
we have not as yetany sufficient answer to give; let us not imagine 
that a general puzzling of us all is to be the end of our discussion, 
but if we are unable to answer, do you answer, as you have 
promised. Consider, then, whether you will divide pleasure and knowledge 
according to their kinds; or you may let the matter drop, if you are 
able and willing to find some other mode of clearing up our controversy. 

     Soc. If you say that, I have nothing to apprehend, for the words 
"if you are willing" dispel all my fear; and, moreover, a god seems to 
have recalled something to my mind. 

     Phi. What is that? 

     Soc. I remember to have heard long ago certain discussions about 
pleasure and wisdom, whether awake or in a dream I cannot tell; they 
were to the effect that neither the one nor the other of them was the 
good, but some third thing, which was different from them, and better 
than either. If this be clearly established, then pleasure will lose 
the victory, for the good will cease to be identified with her:-Am I 
not right? 

     Pro. Yes. 

     Soc. And there will cease to be any need of distinguishing the 
kinds of pleasures, as I am inclined to think, but this will appear 
more clearly as we proceed. 

     Pro. Capital, Socrates; pray go on as you propose. 

     Soc. But, let us first agree on some little points. 

     Pro. What are they? 

     Soc. Is the good perfect or imperfect? 

     Pro. The most perfect, Socrates, of all things. 

     Soc. And is the good sufficient? 

     Pro. Yes, certainly, and in a degree surpassing all other things. 

     Soc. And no one can deny that all percipient beings desire and 
hunt after good, and are eager to catch and have the good about them, 
and care not for the attainment of anything which its not accompanied 
by good. 

     Pro. That is undeniable. 

     Soc. Now let us part off the life of pleasure from the life of 
wisdom, and pass them in review. 

     Pro. How do you mean? 

     Soc. Let there be no wisdom in the life of pleasure, nor any 
pleasure in the life of wisdom, for if either of them is the chief good, 
it cannot be supposed to want anything, but if either is shown to want 
anything, then it cannot really be the chief good. 

     Pro. Impossible. 

     Soc. And will you help us to test these two lives? 

     Pro. Certainly. 

     Soc. Then answer. 

     Pro. Ask. 

     Soc. Would you choose, Protarchus, to live all your life long in 
the enjoyment of the greatest pleasures? 

     Pro. Certainly I should. 

     Soc. Would you consider that there was still anything wanting to 
you if you had perfect pleasure? 

     Pro. Certainly not. 

     Soc. Reflect; would you not want wisdom and intelligence and 
forethought, and similar qualities? would you not at any rate want 
sight? 

     Pro. Why should I? Having pleasure I should have all things. 

     Soc. Living thus, you would always throughout your life enjoy the 
greatest pleasures? 

     Pro. I should. 

     Soc. But if you had neither mind, nor memory, nor knowledge, nor 
true opinion, you would in the first place be utterly ignorant of 
whether you were pleased or not, because you would be entirely devoid 
of intelligence. 

     Pro. Certainly. 

     Soc. And similarly, if you had no memory you would not recollect 
that you had ever been pleased, nor would the slightest recollection of 
the pleasure which you feel at any moment remain with you; and if you 
had no true opinion you would not think that you were pleased when you 
were; and if you had no power of calculation you would not be able to 
calculate on future pleasure, and your life would be the life, not of 
a man, but of an oyster or pulmo marinus. Could this be otherwise? 

     Pro. No. 

     Soc. But is such a life eligible? 

     Pro. I cannot answer you, Socrates; the argument has taken away 
from me the power of speech. 

     Soc. We must keep up our spirits;-let us now take the life of mind 
and examine it in turn. 

     Pro. And what is this life of mind? 

     Soc. I want to know whether any one of us would consent to live, 
having wisdom and mind and knowledge and memory of all things, but 
having no sense of pleasure or pain, and wholly unaffected by these and 
the like feelings? 

     Pro. Neither life, Socrates, appears eligible to me, or is likely, 
as I should imagine, to be chosen by any one else. 

     Soc. What would you say, Protarchus, to both of these in one, or 
to one that was made out of the union of the two? 

     Pro. Out of the union, that is, of pleasure with mind and wisdom? 

     Soc. Yes, that is the life which I mean. 

     Pro. There can be no difference of opinion; not some but all would 
surely choose this third rather than either of the other two, and in 
addition to them. 

     Soc. But do you see the consequence? 

     Pro. To be sure I do. The consequence is, that two out of the 
three lives which have been proposed are neither sufficient nor 
eligible for man or for animal. 

     Soc. Then now there can be no doubt that neither of them has the 
good, for the one which had would certainly have been sufficient and 
perfect and eligible for every living creature or thing that was able 
to live such a life; and if any of us had chosen any other, he would 
have chosen contrary to the nature of the truly eligible, and not of 
his own free will, but either through ignorance or from some unhappy 
necessity. 

     Pro. Certainly that seems to be true. 

     Soc. And now have I not sufficiently shown that Philebus, goddess 
is not to be regarded as identical with the good? 

     Phi. Neither is your "mind" the good, Socrates, for that will be 
open to the same objections. 

     Soc. Perhaps, Philebus, you may be right in saying so of my "mind"; 
but of the true, which is also the divine mind, far otherwise. However, 
I will not at present claim the first place for mind as against the 
mixed life; but we must come to some understanding about the second 
place. For you might affirm pleasure and I mind to be the cause of the 
mixed life; and in that case although neither of them would be the good, 
one of them might be imagined to be the cause of the good. And I might 
proceed further to argue in opposition to Phoebus, that the element 
which makes this mixed life eligible and good, is more akin and more 
similar to mind than to pleasure. And if this is true, pleasure cannot 
be truly said to share either in the first or second place, and does 
not, if I may trust my own mind, attain even to the third. 

     Pro. Truly, Socrates, pleasure appears to me to have had a fall; 
in fighting for the palm, she has been smitten by the argument, and is 
laid low. I must say that mind would have fallen too, and may therefore 
be thought to show discretion in not putting forward a similar claim. 
And if pleasure were deprived not only of the first but of the second 
place, she would be terribly damaged in the eyes of her admirers, for 
not even to them would she still appear as fair as before. 

     Soc. Well, but had we not better leave her now, and not pain her 
by applying the crucial test, and finally detecting her? 

     Pro. Nonsense, Socrates. 

     Soc. Why? because I said that we had better not pain pleasure, 
which is an impossibility? 

     Pro. Yes, and more than that, because you do not seem to be aware 
that none of us will let you go home until you have finished the 
argument. 

     Soc. Heavens! Protarchus, that will be a tedious business, and 
just at present not at all an easy one. For in going to war in the 
cause of mind, who is aspiring to the second prize, I ought to have 
weapons of another make from those which I used before; some, however, 
of the old ones may do again. And must I then finish the argument? 

     Pro. Of course you must. 

     Soc. Let us be very careful in laying the foundation. 

Pro. What do you mean? 

     Soc. Let us divide all existing things into two, or rather, if you 
do not object, into three classes. 

     Pro. Upon what principle would you make the division? 

     Soc. Let us take some of our newly-found notions. 

     Pro. Which of them? 

     Soc. Were we not saying that God revealed a finite element of 
existence, and also an infinite? 

     Pro. Certainly. 

     Soc. Let us assume these two principles, and also a third, which 
is compounded out of them; but I fear that am ridiculously clumsy at 
these processes of division and enumeration. 

     Pro. What do you mean, my good friend? 

     Soc. I say that a fourth class is still wanted. 

     Pro. What will that be? 

     Soc. Find the cause of the third or compound, and add this as a 
fourth class to the three others. 

     Pro. And would you like to have a fifth dass or cause of 
resolution as well as a cause of composition? 

     Soc. Not, I think, at present; but if I want a fifth at some 
future time you shall allow me to have it. 

     Pro. Certainly. 

     Soc. Let us begin with the first three; and as we find two out of 
the three greatly divided and dispersed, let us endeavour to reunite 
them, and see how in each of them there is a one and many. 

     Pro. If you would explain to me a little more about them, perhaps 
I might be able to follow you. 

     Soc. Well, the two classes are the same which I mentioned before, 
one the finite, and the other the infinite; I will first show that the 
infinite is in a certain sense many, and the finite may be hereafter 
discussed. 

     Pro. I agree. 

     Soc. And now consider well; for the question to which I invite 
your attention is difficult and controverted. When you speak of hotter 
and colder, can you conceive any limit in those qualities? Does not the 
more and less, which dwells in their very nature, prevent their having 
any end? for if they had an end, the more and less would themselves 
have an end. 

     Pro. That is most true. 

     Soc. Ever, as we say, into the hotter and the colder there enters 
a more and a less. 

     Pro. Yes. 

     Soc. Then, says the argument, there is never any end of them, and 
being endless they  must also be infinite. 

     Pro. Yes, Socrates, that is exceedingly true. 

     Soc. Yes, my dear Protarchus, and your answer reminds me that such 
an expression as "exceedingly," which you have just uttered, and also 
the term "gently," have the same significance as more or less; for whenever 
they occur they do not allow of the existence of quantity-they are 
always introducing degrees into actions, instituting a comparison of a 
more or a less excessive or a more or a less gentle, and at each
creation of more or less, quantity disappears. For, as I was just now 
saying, if quantity and measure did not disappear, but were allowed to 
intrude in the sphere of more and less and the other comparatives, 
these last would be driven out of their own domain. When definite 
quantity is once admitted, there can be no longer a "hotter" or a
"colder" (for these are always progressing, and are never in one stay); 
but definite quantity is at rest, and has ceased to progress. Which 
proves that comparatives, such as the hotter, and the colder, are to be 
ranked in the class of the infinite. 

     Pro. Your remark certainly, has the look of truth, Socrates; but 
these subjects, as you were saying, are difficult to follow at first. 
I think however, that if I could hear the argument repeated by you once 
or twice, there would be a substantial agreement between us. 

     Soc. Yes, and I will try to meet your wish; but, as I would rather 
not waste time in the enumeration of endless particulars, let me know 
whether I may not assume as a note of the infinite- 

Pro. What? 

     Soc. I want to know whether such things as appear to us to admit 
of more or less, or are denoted by the words "exceedingly," "gently," 
"extremely," and the like, may not be referred to the class of the 
infinite, which is their unity, for, as was asserted in the previous 
argument, all things that were divided and dispersed should be brought
together, and have the mark or seal of some one nature, if possible, 
set upon them-do you remember? 

     Pro. Yes. 

     Soc. And all things which do not admit of more or less, but admit 
their opposites, that is to say, first of all, equality, and the equal, 
or again, the double, or any other ratio of number and measure-all 
these may, I think, be rightly reckoned by us in the class of the limited 
or finite; what do you say? 

     Pro. Excellent, Socrates. 

     Soc. And now what nature shall we ascribe to the third or compound 
kind? 

     Pro. You, I think, will have to tell me that. 

     Soc. Rather God will tell you, if there be any God who will listen 
to my prayers. 

     Pro. Offer up a prayer, then, and think. 

     Soc. I am thinking, Protarchus, and I believe that some God has 
befriended us. 

     Pro. What do you mean, and what proof have you to offer of what 
you are saying? 

     Soc. I will tell you, and do you listen to my words. 

     Pro. Proceed. 

     Soc. Were we not speaking just now of hotter and colder? 

     Pro. True. 

     Soc. Add to them drier, wetter, more, less, swifter, 
slower, greater, smaller, and all that in the preceding argument we 
placed under the unity of more and less. 

     Pro. In the class of the infinite, you mean? 

     Soc. Yes; and now mingle this with the other. 

     Pro. What is the other. 

     Soc. The class of the finite which we ought to have brought 
together as we did the infinite; but, perhaps, it will come to the same 
thing if we do so now;-when the two are combined, a third will appear. 

     Pro. What do you mean by the class of the finite? 

     Soc. The class of the equal and the double, and any class which 
puts an end to difference and opposition, and by introducing number 
creates harmony and proportion among the different elements. 

     Pro. I understand; you seem to me to mean that the various 
opposites, when you mingle with them the class of the finite, takes 
certain forms. 

     Soc. Yes, that is my meaning. 

     Pro. Proceed. 

     Soc. Does not the right participation in the finite give 
health-in disease, for instance? 

     Pro. Certainly. 

     Soc. And whereas the high and low, the swift and the slow are 
infinite or unlimited, does not the addition of the principles 
aforesaid introduce a limit, and perfect the whole frame of music? 

     Pro. Yes, certainly. 

     Soc. Or, again, when cold and heat prevail, does not the 
introduction of them take away excess and indefiniteness, and infuse 
moderation and harmony? 

     Pro. Certainly. 

     Soc. And from a like admixture of the finite and infinite come the 
seasons, and all the delights of life? 

     Pro. Most true. 

     Soc. I omit ten thousand other things, such as beauty and health 
and strength, and the many beauties and high perfections of the soul: 
O my beautiful Philebus, the goddess, methinks, seeing the universal 
wantonness and wickedness of all things, and that there was in them 
no limit to pleasures and self-indulgence, devised the limit of law and
order, whereby, as you say, Philebus, she torments, or as I maintain, 
delivers the soul-What think you, Protarchus? 

     Pro. Her ways are much to my mind, Socrates. 

     Soc. You will observe that I have spoken of three classes? 

     Pro. Yes, I think that I understand you: you mean to say that the 
infinite is one class, and that the finite is a second class of 
existences; but what you would make the third I am not so certain. 

     Soc. That is because the amazing variety of the third class is too 
much for you, my dear friend; but there was not this difficulty with 
the infinite, which also comprehended many classes, for all of them 
were sealed with the note of more and less, and therefore appeared one. 

     Pro. True. 

     Soc. And the finite or limit had not many divisions, and we ready 
acknowledged it to be by nature one? 

     Pro. Yes. 

     Soc. Yes, indeed; and when I speak of the third class, understand 
me to mean any offspring of these, being a birth into true being, 
effected by the measure which the limit introduces. 

     Pro. I understand. 

     Soc. Still there was, as we said, a fourth class to be 
investigated, and you must assist in the investigation; for does not 
everything which comes into being, of necessity come into being 
through a cause? 

     Pro. Yes, certainly; for how can there be anything which has no 
cause? 

     Soc. And is not the agent the same as the cause in all except 
name; the agent and the cause may be rightly called one? 

     Pro. Very true. 

     Soc. And the same may be said of the patient, or effect; we shall 
find that they too differ, as I was saying, only in name-shall we not? 

     Pro. We shall. 

     Soc. The agent or cause always naturally leads, and the patient 
or effect naturally follows it? 

     Pro. Certainly. 

     Soc. Then the cause and what is subordinate to it in generation 
are not the same, but different? 

     Pro. True. 

     Soc. Did not the things which were generated, and the things out 
of which they were generated, furnish all the three classes? 

     Pro. Yes. 

     Soc. And the creator or cause of them has been satisfactorily 
proven to be distinct from them-and may therefore be called a fourth 
principle? 

     Pro. So let us call it. 

     Soc. Quite right; but now, having distinguished the four, I think 
that we had better refresh our memories by recapitulating each of them 
in order. 

     Pro. By all means. 

     Soc. Then the first I will call the infinite or unlimited, and the 
second the finite or limited; then follows the third, an essence 
compound and generated; and I do not think that I shall be far wrong 
in speaking of the cause of mixture and generation as the fourth. 

     Pro. Certainly not. 

     Soc. And now what is the next question, and how came we hither? Were 
we not enquiring whether the second place belonged to pleasure or 
wisdom? 

     Pro. We were. 

     Soc. And now, having determined these points, shall we not be 
better able to decide about the first and second place, which was the 
original subject of dispute? 

     Pro. I dare say. 

     Soc. We said, if you remember, that the mixed life of pleasure and 
wisdom was the conqueror-did we not? 

     Pro. True. 

     Soc. And we see what is the place and nature of this life and to 
what class it is to be assigned? 

     Pro. Beyond a doubt. 

     Soc. This is evidently comprehended in the third or mixed class; 
which is not composed of any two particular ingredients, but of all the 
elements of infinity, bound down by the finite, and may therefore be 
truly said to comprehend the conqueror life. 

     Pro. Most true. 

     Soc. And what shall we say, Philebus, of your life which is all 
sweetness; and in which of the aforesaid classes is that to be placed? 
Perhaps you will allow me to ask you a question before you answer? 

     Phi. Let me hear. 

     Soc. Have pleasure and pain a limit, or do they belong to the 
class which admits of more and less? 

     Phi. They belong to the class which admits of more, Socrates; for 
pleasure would not be perfectly good if she were not infinite in 
quantity and degree. 

     Soc. Nor would pain, Philebus, be perfectly evil. And therefore 
the infinite cannot be that element which imparts to pleasure some 
degree of good. But now-admitting, if you like, that pleasure is of the 
nature of the infinite-in which of the aforesaid classes, O Protarchus 
and Philebus, can we without irreverence place wisdom and knowledge
and mind? And let us be careful, for I think that the danger will be 
very serious if we err on this point. 

     Phi. You magnify, Socrates, the importance of your favourite god. 

     Soc. And you, my friend, are also magnifying your favourite 
goddess; but still I must beg you to answer the question. 

     Pro. Socrates is quite right, Philebus, and we must submit to him. 

     Phi. And did not you, Protarchus, propose to answer in my place? 

     Pro. Certainly I did; but I am now in a great strait, and I must 
entreat you, Socrates, to be our spokesman, and then we shall not say 
anything wrong or disrespectful of your favourite. 

     Soc. I must obey you, Protarchus; nor is the task which you 
impose a difficult one; but did I really, as Philebus implies, 
disconcert you with my playful solemnity, when I asked the question to 
what class mind and knowledge belong? 

     Pro. You did, indeed, Socrates. 

     Soc. Yet the answer is easy, since all philosophers assert with
 one voice that mind is the king of heaven and earth-in reality they 
are magnifying themselves. And perhaps  they are right. But still I 
should like to consider the class of mind, if you do not object, a 
little more fully. 

     Phi. Take your own course, Socrates, and never mind length; we 
shall not tire of you.

     Soc. Very good; let us begin then, Protarchus, by asking a 
question. 

     Pro. What question? 

     Soc. Whether all this which they call the universe is left to the 
guidance of unreason and chance medley, or, on the contrary, as our 
fathers have declared, ordered and governed by a marvellous 
intelligence and wisdom. 

     Pro. Wide asunder are the two assertions, illustrious Socrates, 
for that which you were just now saying to me appears to be blasphemy; 
but the other assertion, that mind orders all things, is worthy of the 
aspect of the world, and of the sun, and of the moon, and of the stars 
and of the whole circle of the heavens; and never will I say or think 
otherwise. 

     Soc. Shall we then agree with them of old time in maintaining this 
doctrine-not merely reasserting the notions of others, without risk to 
ourselves,-but shall we share in the danger, and take our part of the
 reproach which will await us, when an ingenious individual declares 
that all is disorder? 

     Pro. That would certainly be my wish. 

     Soc. Then now please to consider the next stage of the argument. 

     Pro. Let me hear. 

     Soc. We see that the elements which enter into the nature of the 
bodies of all animals, fire, water, air, and, as the storm-tossed 
sailor cries, "land" [i.e., earth], reappear in the constitution of the 
world. 

     Pro. The proverb may be applied to us; for truly the storm gathers 
over us, and we are at our wit's end. 

     Soc. There is something to be remarked about each of these 
elements. 

     Pro. What is it? 

     Soc. Only a small fraction of any one of them exists in us, and 
that of a mean sort, and not in any way pure, or having any power 
worthy of its nature. One instance will prove this of all of them; 
there is fire within us, and in the universe. 

     Pro. True. 

     Soc. And is not our fire small and weak and mean? But the fire in 
the universe is wonderful in quantity and beauty, and in every power 
that fire has. 

     Pro. Most true. 

     Soc. And is the fire in the universe nourished and generated and 
ruled by the fire in us, or is the fire in you and me, and in other 
animals, dependent on the universal fire? 

     Pro. That is a question which does not deserve an answer. 

     Soc. Right; and you would say the same, if I am not mistaken, of 
the earth which is in animals and the earth which is in the universe, 
and you would give a similar reply about all the other elements? 

     Pro. Why, how could any man who gave any other be deemed in his 
senses? 

     Soc. I do not think that he could-but now go on to the next step. 
When we saw those elements of which we have been speaking gathered up 
in one, did we not call them a body? 

     Pro. We did. 

     Soc. And the same may be said of the cosmos, which for the same 
reason may be considered to be a body, because made up of the same 
elements. 

     Pro. Very true. 

     Soc. But is our body nourished wholly by this body, or is this 
body nourished by our body, thence deriving and having the qualities of 
which we were just now speaking? 

     Pro. That again, Socrates, is a question which does not deserve to 
be asked. 

     Soc. Well, tell me, is this question worth asking? 

     Pro. What question? 

     Soc. May our body be said to have a soul? 

     Pro. Clearly. 

     Soc. And whence comes that soul, my dear Protarchus, unless the 
body of the universe, which contains elements like those in our bodies 
but in every way fairer, had also a soul? Can there be another source? 

     Pro. Clearly, Socrates, that is the only source. 

     Soc. Why, yes, Protarchus; for surely we cannot imagine that of 
the four classes, the finite, the infinite, the composition of the two, 
and the cause, the fourth, which enters into all things, giving to our 
bodies souls, and the art of self-management, and of healing disease, 
and operating in other ways to heal and organize, having too all the
attributes of wisdom;-we cannot, I say, imagine that whereas the 
self-same elements exist, both in the entire heaven and in great 
provinces of the heaven, only fairer and purer, this last should not 
also in that higher sphere have designed the noblest and fairest 
things? 

     Pro. Such a supposition is quite unreasonable. 

     Soc. Then if this be denied, should we not be wise in adopting the 
other view and maintaining that there is in the universe a mighty 
infinite and an adequate limit, of which we have often spoken, as well 
as a presiding cause of no mean power, which orders and arranges years 
and seasons and months, and may be justly called wisdom and mind? 

     Pro. Most justly. 

     Soc. And wisdom and mind cannot exist without soul? 

Pro. Certainly not. 

     Soc. And in the divine nature of Zeus would you not say that there 
is the soul and mind of a king, because there is in him the power of 
the cause? And other gods have other attributes, by which they are 
pleased to be called. 

     Pro. Very true. 

     Soc. Do not then suppose that these words are rashly spoken by us, 
O Protarchus, for they are in harmony with the testimony of those who 
said of old time that mind rules the universe. 

     Pro. True. 

     Soc. And they furnish an answer to my enquiry; for they imply that 
mind is the parent of that class of the four which we called the cause 
of all; and I think that you now have my answer. 

     Pro. I have indeed, and yet I did not observe that you had 
answered. 

     Soc. A jest is sometimes refreshing, Protarchus, when it 
interrupts earnest discussion. 

     Pro. Very true. 

     Soc. I think, friend, that we have now pretty clearly set forth 
the class to which mind belongs and what is the power of mind. 

     Pro. True. 

     Soc. And the class to which pleasure belongs has also been long 
ago discovered? 

     Pro. Yes. 

     Soc. And let us remember, too, of both of them, (1) that mind was 
akin to the cause and of this family; and (2) that pleasure is infinite 
and belongs to the class which neither has, nor ever will have in 
itself, a beginning, middle, or end of its own. 

     Pro. I shall be sure to remember.