OF CIVIL-GOVERNMENT
Book II
CHAPTER. I.
Sect. 1. It having been shewn in the foregoing discourse,
1. That Adam had not, either by natural right of fatherhood, or by positive
donation from God, any such authority over his children, or dominion over the
world, as is pretended:
2. That if he had, his heirs, yet, had no right to it:
3. That if his heirs had, there being no law of nature nor positive law of God
that determines which is the right heir in all cases that may arise, the right of
succession, and consequently of bearing rule, could not have been certainly
determined:
4. That if even that had been determined, yet the knowledge of which is the
eldest line of Adam's posterity,being so long since utterly lost, that in the races of
mankind and families of the world, there remains not to one above another, the
least pretence to be the eldest house, and to have the right of inheritance:
5. All these premises having, as I think, been clearly made out, it is impossible
that the rulers now on earth should make any benefit, or derive any the least
shadow of authority from that, which is held to be the fountain of all power,
Adam's private dominion and paternal jurisdiction: so that he that will not give
just occasion to think that all government in the world is the product only of force
and violence, and that men live together by no other rules but that of beasts, where
the strongest carries it, and so lay a foundation for perpetual disorder and mischief,
tumult, sedition and rebellion, (things that the followers of that hypothesis so loudly
cry out against) must of necessity find out another rise of government, another
original of political power, and another way of designing and knowing the persons
that have it, than what Sir Robert Filmer hath taught us.
Sect. 2. To this purpose, I think it may not be amiss, to set down what I take to be
political power; that the power of a magistrate over a subject may be distinguished
from that of a father over his children, a master over his servant, a husband over
his wife, and a lord over his slave. All which distinct powers happening sometimes
together in the same man, if he be considered under these different relations, it may
help us to distinguish these powers one another and shew the difference betwixt a
ruler of a commonwealth, a father of a family, and a captain of a galley.
Sect. 3. Political power, then, I take to be a right of making laws with penalties of
death, and consequently all less penalties, for the regulating and preserving of
property, and of employing the force of the community, in the execution of such
laws, and in the defence of the common-wealth from foreign injury; and all this
only for the public good.
C H A P. I I.
Of the State of Nature.
Sect. 4. TO understand political power right, and derive it from its original, we must
consider, what state all men are naturally in, and that is, a state of perfect freedom
to order their actions, and dispose of their possessions and persons, as they think
fit, within the bounds of the law of nature, without asking leave, or depending upon
the will of any other man.
A state also of wherin all the power and jurisdiction is reciprocal, no one having
more than another; there being nothing more evident, than that the creatures of the
same species and rank, promiscuously born to all the same advantages of nature,
and the use of the same faculties, should also be equal one amongst another without
subordination or subjection, unless the lord and master of them all should, by any
manifest declaration of his will, set one above another, and confer on him, by an
evident and clear appointment, an undoubted right to dominion and sovereignty.
Sect. 5. This equality of men by nature, the judicious Hooker looks upon as so
evident in itself, and beyond all question, that he makes it the foundation of that
obligation to mutual love amongst men, on which he builds the duties they owe one
another, and from whence he derives the great maxims of justice and charity. His
words are,
The like natural inducement hath brought men to know that it is no
less their duty, to love others than themselves; for seeing those things
which are equal, must needs all have one measure; if I cannot but wish
to receive good, even as much at every man's hands, as any man can
wish unto his own soul, how should I look to have any part of my
desire herein satisfied, unless myself be careful to satisfy the like
desire, which is undoubtedly in other men, being of one and the same
nature? To have any thing offered them repugnant to this desire, must
needs in all respects grieve them as much as me; so that if I do harm, I
must look to suffer, there being no reason that others should shew
greater measure of love to me, than they have by me shewed unto them:
my desire therefore to be loved of my equals in nature as much as
possible may be, imposes upon me a natural duty of bearing to
them-ward fully the like affection; from which relation of equality
between ourselves and them that are as ourselves, what several rules
and canons natural reason hath drawn, for direction of life, no man is
ignorant .Eccl. Pol. Lib. 1.
Sect. 6. But though this be a state of liberty, yet it is not a state of licence: though
man in that state have an uncontrollable liberty to dispose of his person or
possessions, yet he has not liberty to destroy himself, or so much as any creature in
his possession, but where some nobler use than its bare preservation calls for it.
The state of nature has a law of nature to govern it, which obliges every one: and
reason, which is that law, teaches all mankind, who will but consult it, that being all
equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty, or
possessions: for men being all the workmanship of one omnipotent, and infinitely
wise maker; all the servants of one sovereign master, sent into the world by his
order, and about his business; they are his property, whose workmanship they are,
made to last during his, not one another's pleasure: and being furnished with like
faculties, sharing all in one community of nature, there cannot be supposed any
such subordination among us, that may authorize us to destroy one another, as if
we were made for one another's uses, as the inferior ranks of creatures are for
our's. Every one, as he is bound to preserve himself, and not to quit his station
wilfully, so by the like reason, when his own preservation comes not in
competition, ought he, as much as he can, to preserve the rest of mankind, and
may not, unless it be to do justice on an offender, take away, or impair the life, or
what tends to the preservation of the life, the liberty, health, limb, or goods of
another.
Sect. 7. And that all men may be restrained from invading others rights, and from
doing hurt to one another, and the law of nature be observed, which willeth the
peace and preservation of all mankind, the execution of the law of nature is, in
that state, put into every man's hands, whereby every one has a right to punish the
transgressors of that law to such a degree, as may hinder its violation: for the law of
nature would, as all other laws that concern men in this world 'be in vain, if there
were no body that in the state of nature had a power to execute that law, and
thereby preserve the innocent and restrain offenders. And if any one in the state of nature
may punish another for any evil he has done, every one may do so: for in
that state of perfect equality, where naturally there is no superiority or jurisdiction
of one over another, what any may do in prosecution of that law, every one must
needs have a right to do.
Sect. 8. And thus, in the state of nature, one man comes by a power over another;
but yet no absolute or arbitrary power, to use a criminal, when he has got him in his
hands, according to the passionate heats, or boundless extravagancy of his own will;
but only to retribute to him, so far as calm reason and conscience dictate, what is
proportionate to his transgression, which is so much as may serve for reparation
and restraint: for these two are the only reasons, why one man may lawfully do
harm to another, which is that we call punishment. In transgressing the law of
nature, the offender declares himself to live by another rule than that of reason and
common equity, which is that measure God has set to the actions of men, for their
mutual security; and so he becomes dangerous to mankind, the tye, which is to
secure them from injury and violence, being slighted and broken by him. Which
being a trespass against the whole species, and the peace and safety of it, provided
for by the law of nature, every man upon this score, by the right he hath to
preserve mankind in general, may restrain, or where it is necessary, destroy things
noxious to them, and so may bring such evil on any one, who hath transgressed that
law, as may make him repent the doing of it, and thereby deter him, and by his
example others, from doing the like mischief. And in the case, and upon this
ground, every man hath a right to punish the offender, and be executioner of the
law of nature.
Sect. 9. 1 doubt not but this will seem a very strange doctrine to some men: but
before they condemn it, I desire them to resolve me, by what right any prince or
state can put to death, or punish an alien, for any crime he commits in their
country. It is certain their laws, by virtue of any sanction they receive from the
promulgated will of the legislative, reach not a stranger: they speak not to him, nor,
if they did, is he bound to hearken to them. The legislative authority, by which they
are in force over the subjects of that commonwealth, hath no power over him.
Those who have the supreme power of making laws in England, France or
Holland, are to an Indian, but like the rest of the world, men without authority: and
therefore, if by the law of nature every man hath not a power to punish offences
against it, as he soberly judges the case to require, I see not how the magistrates of
any community can punish an alien of another country; since, in reference to him,
they can have no more power than what every man naturally may have over
another.
Sect, 10. Besides the crime which consists in violating the law, and varying from
the right rule of reason, whereby a man so far becomes degenerate, and declares
himself to quit the principles of human nature, and to be a noxious creature, there is
commonly injury done to some person or other, and some other man receives
damage by his transgression: in which case he who hath received any damage, has,
besides the right of punishment common to him with other men, a particular right to seek reparation from him that has done it: and any other person, who finds it just,
may also join with him that is injured, and assist him in recovering from the
offender so much as may make satisfaction for the harm he has suffered.
Sect. 11. From these two distinct rights, the one of punishing the crime for
restraint, and preventing the like offence, which right of punishing is in every body;
the other of taking reparation, which belongs only to the injured party, comes it to
pass that the magistrate, who by being magistrate hath the common right of
punishing put into his hands, can often, where the public good demands not the
execution of the law, remit the punishment of criminal offences by his own
authority, but yet cannot remit the satisfaction due to any private man for the
damage he has received. That, he who has suffered the damage has a right to
demand in his own name, and he alone can remit: the damnified person has this
power of appropriating to himself the goods or service of the offender, by right of
self-preservation, as every man has a power to punish the crime, to prevent its
being committed again, by the right he has of preserving all mankind, and doing all
reasonable things he can in order to that end: and thus it is, that every man, in the
state of nature, has a power to kill a murderer, both to deter others from doing the
like injury, which no reparation can compensate, by the example of the punishment
that attends it from every body, and also to secure men from the attempts of a
criminal, who having renounced reason, the common rule and measure God hath
given to mankind, hath, by the unjust violence and slaughter he hath committed
upon one, declared war against all mankind, and therefore may be destroyed as a
lion or a tyger, one of those wild savage beasts, with whom men can have no
society nor security: and upon this is grounded that great law of nature, Whoso
sheddeth man's blood, by man shall his blood be shed. And Cain was so fully
convinced, that every one had a right to destroy such a criminal, that after the
murder of his brother, he cries out, Every one that findeth me, shall slay me; so
plain was it writ in the hearts of all mankind.
Sect. 12. By the same reason may a man in the state of nature punish the lesser
breaches of that law. It will perhaps be demanded, with death? I answer, each
transgression may be punished to that degree, and with so much severity, as will
suffice to make it an ill bargain to the offender, give him cause to repent, and terrify others from doing the like. Every offence, that can be committed in the state of
nature, may in the state of nature be also punished equally, and as far forth as it
may, in a commonwealth: for though it would be besides my present purpose, to
enter here into the particulars of the law of nature, or its measures of punishment;
yet, it is certain there is such a law, and that too, as intelligible and plain to a
rational creature, and a studier of that law, as the positive laws of commonwealths;
nay, possibly plainer; as much as reason is easier to be understood, than the fancies
and intricate contrivances of men, following contrary and hidden interests put into
words; for so truly are a great part of the municipal laws of countries, which are
only so far right, as they are founded on the law of nature, by which they are to be
regulated and interpreted.
Sect. 13. To this strange doctrine, viz. That in the state of nature every one has the
executive power of the law of nature, I doubt not but it will be objected, that it is
unreasonable for men to be judges in their own cases, that self-love will make men
partial to themselves and their friends: and on the other side, that ill nature, passion
and revenge will carry them too far in punishing others; and hence nothing but
confusion and disorder will follow, and that therefore God hath certainly appointed
government to restrain the partiality and violence of men. I easily grant, that civil
government is the proper remedy for the inconveniencies of the state of nature,
which must certainly be great, where men may be judges in their own case, since it
is easy to be imagined, that he who was so unjust as to do his brother an injury, will
scarce be so just as to condemn himself for it: but I shall desire those who make
this objection, to remember, that absolute monarchs are but men; and if
government is to be the remedy of those evils, which necessarily follow from men's
being judges in their own cases, and the state of nature is therefore not to how
much better it is than the state of nature, where one man, commanding a multitude,
has the liberty to be judge in his own case, and may do to all his subjects whatever
he pleases, without the least liberty to any one to question or control those who
execute his pleasure? and in whatsoever he doth, whether led by reason, mistake or
passion, must be submitted to? much better it is in the state of nature, wherein men
are not bound to submit to the unjust will of another: and if he that judges, judges
amiss in his own, or any other case, he is answerable for it to the rest of mankind.
Sect. 14. It is often asked as a mighty objection, where are, or ever were there any
men in such a state of nature? To which it may suffice as an answer at present,
that since all princes and rulers of independent governments all through the world,
are in a state of nature, it is plain the world never was, nor ever will be, without
numbers of men in that state. I have named all governors of independent
communities, whether they are, or are not, in league with others: for it is not every
compact that puts an end to the state of nature between men, but only this one of
agreeing together mutually to enter into one community, and make one body politic;
other promises, and compacts, men may make one with another, and yet still be in
the state of nature. The promises and bargains for truck, &c.; between the two men
in the desert island, mentioned by Garcilasso de la Vega, in his history of Peru; or
between a Swiss and an Indian, in the woods of America, are binding to them,
though they are perfectly in a state of nature, in reference to one another: for truth
and keeping of faith belongs to men, as men, and not as members of society.
Sect. 15. To those that say, there were never any men in the state of nature, I will
not only oppose the authority of the judicious Hooker, Eccl. Pol. lib. i. sect. 10,
where he says, The laws which have been hitherto mentioned, i.e. the laws of
nature, do bind men absolutely, even as they are men, although they have never
any settled fellowship, never any solemn agreement amongst themselves what to
do, or not to do: but forasmuch as we are not by ourselves sufficient to furnish
ourselves with competent store of things, needful for such a life as our nature doth
desire, a life fit for the dignity of man; therefore to supply those defects and
imperfections which are in us, as living single and solely by ourselves, we are
naturally induced to seek communion and fellowship with others: this was the
cause of men's uniting themselves at first in politic societies. But I moreover
affirm, that all men are naturally in that state, and remain so, till by their own
consents they make themselves members of some politic society; and I doubt not in
the sequel of this discourse, to make it very clear.
C H A P. I I I.
Of the State of War.Sect. 16. THE state of war is a state of enmity and destruction: and therefore
declaring by word or action, not a passionate and hasty, but a sedate settled design
upon another man's life, puts him in a state of war with him against whom he has
declared such an intention, and so has exposed his life to the other's power to be
taken away by him, or any one that joins with him in his defence, and espouses his
quarrel; it being reasonable and just, I should have a right to destroy that which
threatens me with destruction: for, by the fundamental law of nature, man being to
be preserved as much as possible, when all cannot be preserved, the safety of the
innocent is to be preferred: and one may destroy a man who makes war upon him,
or has discovered an enmity to his being, for the same reason that he may kill a
wolf or a lion; because such men are not under the ties of the commonlaw of
reason, have no other rule, but that of force and violence, and so may be treated as
beasts of prey, those dangerous and noxious creatures, that will be sure to destroy
him whenever he falls into their power.
Sect, 17. And hence it is, that he who attempts to get another man into his absolute
power, does thereby put himself into a state of war with him; it being to be
understood as a declaration of a design upon his life: for I have reason to conclude,
that he who would get me into his power without my consent, would use me as he
pleased when he had got me there, and destroy me too when he had a fancy to it;
for no body can desire to have me in his absolute power, unless it be to compel me
by force to that which is against the right of my freedom, i.e. make me a slave. To
be free from such force is the only security of my preservation; and reason bids me
look on him, as an enemy to my preservation, who would take away that freedom
which is the fence to it; so that he who makes an attempt to enslave me, thereby
puts himself into a state of war with me. He that, in the state of nature, would take
away the freedom that belongs to any one in that state, must necessarily be
supposed to have a design to take away everything else, that freedom being the
foundation of all the rest; as he that, in the state of society, would take away the
freedom belonging to those of that society or commonwealth, must be supposed to
design to take away from them every thing else, and so be looked on as in a state
of war.
Sect. 18. This makes it lawful for a man to kill a thief, who has not in the least hurt
him, nor declared any design upon his life, any farther than, by the use of force, so
to get him in his power, as to take away his money, or what he pleases, from him;
because using force, where he has no right, to get me into his power, let his
pretence be what it will, I have no reason to suppose, that he, who would take
away my liberty, would not, when he had me in his power, take away every thing
else. And therefore it is lawful for me to treat him as one who has put himself into
a state of war with me, i.e. kill him if I can; for to that hazard does he justly expose
himself, whoever introduces a state of war, and is aggressor in it.
Sect. 19. And here we have the plain difference between the state of nature and the
state of war, which however some men have confounded, are as far distant, as a
state of peace, good will, mutual assistance and preservation, and a state of enmity,
malice, violence and mutual destruction, are one from another. Men living together
according to reason, without a common superior on earth, with authority to judge
between them, is properly the state of nature. But force, or a declared design of
force, upon the person of another, where there is no common superior on earth to
appeal to for relief, is the state of war: and it is the want of such an appeal gives a
man the right of war even against an aggressor, tho' he be in society and a fellow
subject. Thus a thief, whom I cannot harm, but by appeal to the law, for having
stolen all that I am worth, I may kill, when he sets on me to rob me but of my
horse or coat; because the law, which was made for my preservation, where it
cannot interpose to secure my life from present force, which, if lost, is capable of
no reparation, permits me my own defence, and the right of war, a liberty to kill the
aggressor, because the aggressor allows not time to appeal to our common judge,
nor the decision of the law, for remedy in a case where the mischief may be
irreparable. Want of a common judge with authority, puts all men in a state of
nature: force without right, upon a man's person, makes a state of war, both where
there is, and is not, a common judge.
CHAP. V.
Of PROPERTY.
Sect. 25. Whether we consider natural reason, which tells us, that men, being once
born, have a right to their preservation, and consequently to meat and drink, and
such other things as nature affords for their subsistence: or revelation, which gives
us an account of those grants God made of the world to Adam, and to Noah, and
his sons, it is very clear, that God, as king David says, Psal. cxv. 16. has given the
earth to the children of men; given it to mankind in common. But this being
supposed, it seems to some a very great difficulty, how any one should ever come
to have a property in any thing: I will not content myself to answer, that if it be
difficult to make out property, upon a supposition that God gave the world to
Adam, and his posterity in common, it is impossible that any man, but one universal
monarch, should have any property upon a supposition, that God gave the world to
Adam, and his heirs in succession, exclusive of all the rest of his posterity. But I
shall endeavour to shew, how men might come to have a property in several parts
of that which God gave to mankind in common, and that without any express
compact of all the commoners.
Sect. 26. God, who hath given the world to men in common, hath also given them
reason to make use of it to the best advantage of life, and convenience. The earth,
and all that is therein, is given to men for the support and comfort of their being.
And tho' all the fruits it naturally produces, and beasts it feeds, belong to mankind
in common, as they are produced by the spontaneous hand of nature; and no body
has originally a private dominion, exclusive of the rest of mankind, in any of them,
as they are thus in their natural state: yet being given for the use of men, there must
of necessity be a means to appropriate them some way or other, before they can
be of any use, or at all beneficial to any particular man. The fruit, or venison, which
nourishes the wild Indian, who knows no enclosure, and is still a tenant in
common, must be his, and so his, i.e. a part of him, that another can no longer have
any right to it, before it can do him any good for the support of his life.
Sect. 27. Though the earth, and all inferior creatures, be common to all men, yet
every man has a property in his own person: this no body has any right to but
himself. The labour of his body, and the work of his hands, we may say, are
properly his. Whatsoever then he removes out of the state that nature hath
provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his labour with, and joined to it something
that is his own, and thereby makes it his property. It being by him removed from
the common state nature hath placed it in, it hath by this labour something annexed
to it, that excludes the common right of other men: for this labour being the
unquestionable property of the labourer, no man but he can have a right to what
that is once joined to, at least where there is enough, and as good, left in common
for others.
Sect. 45. Thus labour, in the beginning, gave a right of property, wherever any
one was pleased to employ it upon what was common, which remained a long
while the far greater part, and is yet more than mankind makes use of. Men, at
first, for the most part, contented themselves with what unassisted nature offered to
their necessities: and though afterwards, in some parts of the world, (where the
increase of people and stock, with the use of money, had made land scarce, and so
of some value) the several communities settled the bounds of their distinct
territories, and by laws within themselves regulated the properties of the private
men of their society, and so, by compact and agreement, settled the property which
labour and industry began; and the leagues that have been made between several
states and kingdoms, either expresly or tacitly disowning all claim and right to the
land in the others possession, have, by common consent, given up their pretences
to their natural common right, which originally they had to those countries, and so
have, by positive agreement, settled a property amongst themselves, in distinct
parts and parcels of the earth; yet there are still great tracts of ground to be found,
which (the inhabitants thereof not having joined with the rest of mankind, in the
consent of the use of their common money) lie waste, and are more than the
people who dwell on it do, or can make use of, and so still lie in common; tho' this
can scarce happen amongst that part of mankind that have consented to the use of
money.
Sect. 46. The greatest part of things really useful to the life of man, and such as
the necessity of subsisting made the first commoners of the world look after, as it
cloth the Americans now, are generally things of short duration; such as, if they
are not consumed by use, will decay and perish of themselves: gold, silver and
diamonds, are things that fancy or agreement hath put the value on, more than real
use, and the necessary support of life. Now of those good things which nature hath
provided in common, every one had a right (as hath been said) to as much as he
could use, and property in all that he could effect with his labour; all that his
industry could extend to, to alter from the state nature had put it in, was his. He
that gathered a hundred bushels of acorns or apples, had thereby a property in
them, they were his goods as soon as gathered. He was only to look, that he used
them before they spoiled, else he took more than his share, and robbed others. And
indeed it was a foolish thing, as well as dishonest, to hoard up more than he could
make use of. If he gave away a part to any body else, so that it perished not
uselessly in his possession, these he also made use of. And if he also bartered away
plums, that would have rotted in a week, for nuts that would last good for his eating
a whole year, he did no injury; he wasted not the common stock; destroyed no part
of the portion of goods that belonged to others, so long as nothing perished uselessly
in his hands. Again, if he would give his nuts for a piece of metal, pleased with its
colour; or exchange his sheep for shells, or wool for a sparkling pebble or a
diamond, and keep those by him all his life he invaded not the right of others, he
might heap up as much of these durable things as he pleased; the exceeding of the
bounds of his just property not lying in the largeness of his possession, but
perishing of anything uselessly in it.
47. And thus came in the use of money, some lasting thing that men might keep without
spoiling and that my mutual consent men would take in exchange for the truly useful, but
perishable supports of life.
CHAP. VII.
Of Political or Civil Society.
Sect. 77. GOD having made man such a creature, that in his own judgment, it was
not good for him to be alone, put him under strong obligations of necessity,
convenience, and inclination to drive him into society, as well as fitted him with
understanding and language to continue and enjoy it. The first society was between
man and wife, which gave beginning to that between parents and children; to
which, in time, that between master and servant came to be added: and though all
these might, and commonly did meet together, and make up but one family,
wherein the master or mistress of it had some sort of rule proper to a family; each
of these, or all together, came short of political society, as we shall see, if we
consider the different ends, ties, and bounds of each of these.
Sect. 87. Man being born, as has been proved, with a title to perfect freedom, and
an uncontrouled enjoyment of all the rights and privileges of the law of nature,
equally with any other man, or number of men in the world, hath by nature a
power, not only to preserve his property, that is, his life, liberty and estate, against
the injuries and attempts of other men; but to judge of, and punish the breaches of
that law in others, as he is persuaded the offence deserves, even with death itself, in
crimes where the heinousness of the fact, in his opinion, requires it. But because no
political society can be, nor subsist, without having in itself the power to preserve
the property, and in order thereunto, punish the offences of all those of that society;
there, and there only is political society, where every one of the members hath
quitted this natural power, resigned it up into the hands of the community in all
cases that exclude him not from appealing for protection to the law established by
it. And thus all private judgment of every particular member being excluded, the
community comes to be umpire, by settled standing rules, indifferent, and the same
to all parties; and by men having authority from the community, for the execution
of those rules, decides all the differences that may happen between any members of
that society concerning any matter of right; and punishes those offences which any
member hath committed against the society, with such penalties as the law has
established: whereby it is easy to discern, who are, and who are not, in political
society together. Those who are united into one body, and have a common
established law and judicature to appeal to, with authority to decide controversies
between them, and punish offenders, are in civil society one with another: but
those who have no such common appeal, I mean on earth, are still in the state of
nature, each being, where there is no other, judge for himself, and executioner;
which is, as I have before shewed it, the perfect state of nature.
Sect. 88. And thus the common-wealth comes by a power to set down what
punishment shall belong to the several transgressions which they think worthy of it,
committed amongst the members of that society, (which is the power of making
laws) as well as it has the power to punish any injury done unto any of its
members, by any one that is not of it, (which is the power of war and peace;) and
all this for the preservation of the property of all the members of that society, as far
as is possible. But though every man who has entered into civil society, and is
become a member of any commonwealth, has thereby quitted his power to punish
offences, against the law of nature, in prosecution of his own private judgment, yet
with the judgment of offences, which he has given up to the legislative in all cases,
where he can appeal to the magistrate, he has given a right to the common-wealth
to employ his force, for the execution of the judgments of the common-wealth,
whenever he shall be called to it; which indeed are his own judgments, they being
made by himself, or his representative. And herein we have the original of the
legislative and executive power of civil society, which is to judge by standing laws,
how far offences are to be punished, when committed within the common-wealth;
and also to determine, by occasional judgments founded on the present
circumstances of the fact, how far injuries from without are to be vindicated; and in
both these to employ all the force of all the members, when there shall be need.
Sect. 89. Where-ever therefore any number of men are so united into one society,
as to quit every one his executive power of the law of nature, and to resign it to the
public, there and there only is a political, or civil society. And this is done,
where-ever any number of men, in the state of nature, enter into society to make
one people, one body politic, under one supreme government; or else when any one
joins himself to, and incorporates with any government already made: for hereby he
authorizes the society, or which is all one, the legislative thereof, to make laws for
him, as the public good of the society shall require; to the execution whereof, his
own assistance (as to his own decrees) is due. And this puts men out of a state of
nature into that of a common-wealth, by setting up a judge on earth, with authority
to determine all the controversies, and redress the injuries that may happen to any
member of the commonwealth; which judge is the legislative, or magistrates
appointed by it. And where-ever there are any number of men, however associated,
that have no such decisive power to appeal to, there they are still in the state of
nature.
Sect. 90. Hence it is evident, that absolute monarchy, which by some men is
counted the only government in the world, is indeed inconsistent with civil society,
and so can be no form of civil-government at all: for the end of civil society, being
to avoid, and remedy those inconveniencies of the state of nature, which
necessarily follow from every man's being judge in his own case, by setting up a
known authority, to which every one of that society may appeal upon any injury
received, or controversy that may arise, and which every one of the* society ought
to obey; where-ever any persons are, who have not such an authority to appeal to,
for the decision of any difference between them, there those persons are still in the
state of nature; and so is every absolute prince, in respect of those who are under
his dominion.
CHAP. VIII.
Of the Beginning of Political Societies.
Sect. 95. MEN being, as has been said, by nature, all free, equal, and independent,
no one can be put out of this estate, and subjected to the political power of another,
without his own consent. The only way whereby any one divests himself of his
natural liberty, and puts on the bonds of civil society, is by agreeing with other men
to join and unite into a community for their comfortable, safe, and peaceable living
one amongst another, in a secure enjoyment of their properties, and a greater
security against any, that are not of it. This any number of men may do, because it
injures not the freedom of the rest; they are left as they were in the liberty of the
state of nature. When any number of men have so consented to make one
community or government, they are thereby presently incorporated, and make one
body politic, wherein the majority have a right to act and conclude the rest.
Sect. 96. For when any number of men have, by the consent of every individual,
made a community, they have thereby made that community one body, with a
power to act as one body, which is only by the will and determination of the
majority: for that which acts any community, being only the consent of the
individuals of it, and it being necessary to that which is one body to move one way;
it is necessary the body should move that way whither the greater force carries it,
which is the consent of the majority: or else it is impossible it should act or
continue one body, one community, which the consent of every individual that
united into it, agreed that it should; and so every one is bound by that consent to be
concluded by the majority. And therefore we see, that in assemblies, impowered to
act by positive laws, where no number is set by that positive law which impowers
them, the act of the majority passes for the act of the whole, and of course
determines, as having, by the law of nature and reason, the power of the whole.
Sect. 97. And thus every man, by consenting with others to make one body politic
under one government, puts himself under an obligation, to every one of that
society, to submit to the determination of the majority, and to be concluded by it;
or else this original compact, whereby he with others incorporates into one society,
would signify nothing, and be no compact, if he be left free, and under no other ties
than he was in before in the state of nature. For what appearance would there be of
any compact? what new engagement if he were no farther tied by any decrees of
the society, than he himself thought fit, and did actually consent to? This would be
still as great a liberty, as he himself had before his compact, or any one else in the
state of nature hath, who may submit himself, and consent to any acts of it if he
thinks fit.
Sect. 98. For if the consent of the majority shall not, in reason, be received as the
act of the whole, and conclude every individual; nothing but the consent of every
individual can make any thing to be the act of the whole: but such a consent is next
to impossible ever to be had, if we consider the infirmities of health, and avocations
of business, which in a number, though much less than that of a common-wealth,
will necessarily keep many away from the public assembly. To which if we add the
variety of opinions, and contrariety of interests, which unavoidably happen in all
collections of men, the coming into society upon such terms would be only like
Cato's coming into the theatre, only to go out again. Such a constitution as this
would make the mighty Leviathan of a shorter duration, than the feeblest creatures,
and not let it outlast the day it was bom in: which cannot be supposed, till we can
think, that rational creatures should desire and constitute societies only to be
dissolved: for where the majority cannot conclude the rest, there they cannot act as
one body, and consequently will be immediately dissolved again.
Sect. 99. Whosoever therefore out of a state of nature unite into a community,
must be understood to give up all the power, necessary to the ends for which they
unite into society, to the majority of the community, unless they expresly agreed in
any number greater than the majority. And this is done by barely agreeing to unite
into one political society, which is all the compact that is, or needs be, between
the individuals, that enter into, or make up a commonwealth. And thus that, which
begins and actually constitutes any political society, is nothing but the consent of
any number of freemen capable of a majority to unite and incorporate into such a
society. And this is that, and that only, which did, or could give beginning to any
lawful government in the world.
CHAP. IX.
Of the Ends of Political Society and Government.
Sect. 123. IF man in the state of nature be so free, as has been said; if he be
absolute lord of his own person and possessions, equal to the greatest, and subject
to no body, why will he part with his freedom? why will he give up this empire, and
subject himself to the dominion and control of any other power? To which it is
obvious to answer, that though in the state of nature he hath such a right, yet the
enjoyment of it is very uncertain, and constantly exposed to the invasion of others:
for all being kings as much as he, every man his equal, and the greater part no strict
observers of equity and justice, the enjoyment of the property he has in this state is
very unsafe, very unsecure. This makes him willing to quit a condition, which,
however free, is full of fears and continual dangers: and it is not without reason,
that he seeks out, and is willing to join in society with others, who are already
united, or have a mind to unite, for the mutual preservation of their lives, liberties
and estates, which I call by the general name, property.
Sect. 124. The great and chief end, therefore, of men's uniting into
commonwealths, and putting themselves under government, is the preservation of
their property. To which in the state of nature there are man y things wanting.
First, There wants an established, settled, known law, received and allowed by
common consent to be the standard of right and wrong, and the common measure
to decide all controversies between them: for though the law of nature be plain and
intelligible to all rational creatures; yet men being biased by their interest, as well as
ignorant for want of study of it, are not apt to allow of it as a law binding to them in
the application of it to their particular cases.
Sect. 125. Secondly, In the state of nature there wants a known and indifferent
judge, with authority to determine all differences according to the established law:
for every one in that state being both judge and executioner of the law of nature,
men being partial to themselves, passion and revenge is very apt to carry them too
far, and with too much heat, in their own cases; as well as negligence, and
unconcernedness, to make them too remiss in other men's.
Sect. 126. Thirdly, In the state of nature there often wants power to back and
support the sentence when right, and to give it due execution. They who by any
injustice offended, will seldom fail, where they are able, by force to make good
their injustice; such resistance many times makes the punishment dangerous, and
frequently destructive, to those who attempt it.
Sect. 127. Thus mankind, notwithstanding all the privileges of the state of nature,
being but in an ill condition, while they remain in it, are quickly driven into society.
Hence it comes to pass, that we seldom find any number of men live any time
together in this state. The inconveniencies that they are therein exposed to, by the
irregular and uncertain exercise of the power every man has of punishing the
transgressions of others, make them take sanctuary under the established laws of
government, and therein seek the preservation of their property. It is this makes
them so willingly give up every one his single power of punishing, to be exercised
by such alone, as shall be appointed to it amongst them; and by such rules as the
community, or those authorized by them to that purpose, shall agree on. And in this
we have the original right and rise of both the legislative and executive power, as
well as of the governments and societies themselves.
Sect. 128. For in the state of nature, to omit the liberty he has of innocent delights,
a man has two powers.
The first is to do whatsoever he thinks fit for the preservation of himself, and
others within the permission of the law of nature: by which law, common to them
all, he and all the rest of mankind are one community, make up one society,
distinct from all other creatures. And were it not for the corruption and vitiousness
of degenerate men, there would be no need of any other; no necessity that men
should separate from this great and natural community, and by positive agreements
combine into smaller and divided associations.
The other power a man has in the state of nature, is the power to punish the
crimes committed against that law. Both these he gives up, when he joins in a
private, if I may so call it, or particular politic society, and incorporates int o any
common-wealth, separate from the rest of mankind.
Sect. 129. The first power, viz. of doing whatsoever he thought for the
preservation of himself, and the rest of mankind, he gives up to be regulated by
laws made by the society, so far forth as the preservation of himself, and the rest of
that society shall require; which laws of the society in many things confine the
liberty he had by the law of nature.
Sect. 130. Secondly, The power of punishing he wholly gives up, and engages his
natural force, (which he might before employ in the execution of the law of nature,
by his own single authority, as he thought fit) to assist the executive power of the
society, as the law thereof shall require: for being now in a new state, wherein he is
to enjoy many conveniencies, from the labour, assistance, and society of others in
the same community, as well as protection from its whole strength; he is to part
also with as much of his natural liberty, in providing for himself, as the good,
prosperity, and safety of the society shall require; which is not only necessary, but
just, since the other members of the society do the like.
Sect. 131. But though men, when they enter into society, give up the equality,
liberty, and executive power they had in the state of nature, into the hands of the
society, to be so far disposed of by the legislative, as the good of the society shall
require; yet it being only with an intention in every one the better to preserve
himself, his liberty and property; (for no rational creature can be supposed to
change his condition with an intention to be worse) the power of the society, or
legislative constituted by them, can never be supposed to extend farther, than the
common good; but is obliged to secure every one's property, by providing against
those three defects above mentioned, that made the state of nature so unsafe and
uneasy. And so whoever has the legislative or supreme power of any
common-wealth, is bound to govern by established standing laws, promulgated and
known to the people, and not by extemporary decrees; by indifferent and upright
judges, who are to decide controversies by those laws; and to employ the force of
the community at home, only in the execution of such laws, or abroad to prevent
or redress foreign injuries, and secure the community from inroads and invasion.
And all this to be directed to no other end, but the peace, safety, and public good
of the people.
CHAP. X.
Of the Forms of a Common-wealth.
Sect. 132. THE majority having, as has been shewed, upon men's first uniting into
society, the whole power of the community naturally in them, may employ all that
power in making laws for the community from time to time, and exe cuting those
laws by officers of their own appointing; and then the form of the government is a
perfect democracy: or else may put the power of making laws into the hands of a
few select men, and their heirs or successors; and then it is an oligarchy: or else
into the hands of one man, and then it is a monarchy: if to him and his heirs, it is an
hereditary monarchy: if to him only for life, but upon his death the power only of
nominating a successor to return to them; an elective monarchy. And so
accordingly of these the community may make compounded and mixed forms of
government, as they think good. And if the legislative power be at first given by the
majority to one or more persons only for their lives, or any limited time, and then
the supreme power to revert to them again; when it is so reverted, the community
may dispose of it again anew into what hands they please, and so constitute a new
form of government: for the form of government depending upon the placing the
supreme power, which is the legislative, it being impossible to conceive that an
inferior power should prescribe to a superior, or any but the supreme make laws,
according as the power of making laws is placed, such is the form of the
common-wealth.
Sect. 133. By common-wealth, I must be understood all along to mean, not a
democracy, or any form of government, but any independent community, which
the Latines signified by the word civitas, to which the word which best answers in
our language, is common-wealth, and most properly expresses such a society of
men, which community or city in English does not; for there may be subordinate
communities in a government; and city amongst us has a quite different notion from
common-wealth: and therefore, to avoid ambiguity, I crave leave to use the word
common-wealth in that sense, in which I find it used by king James the first; and I
take it to be its genuine signification; which if any body dislike, I consent with him
to change it for a better.
CHAP. XI.
Of the Extent of the Legislative Power.
Sec. 134. THE great end of men's entering into society, being the enjoyment of
their properties in peace and safety, and the great instrument and means of that
being the laws established in that society; the first and fundamental positive law of
all commonwealths is the establishing of the legislative power; as the first and
fundamental natural law, which is to govern even the legislative itself, is the
preservation of the society, and (as far as will consist with the public good) of
every person in it. This legislative is not only the supreme power of the
common-wealth, but sacred and unalterable in the hands where the community
have once placed it; nor can any edict of any body else, in what form soever
conceived, or by what power soever backed, have the force and obligation of a
law, which has not its sanction from that legislative which the public has chosen
and appointed: for without this the law could not have that, which is absolutely
necessary to its being a law,* the consent of the society, over whom no body can
have a power to make laws, but by their own consent, and by authority received
from them; and therefore all the obedience, which by the most solemn ties any one
can be obliged to pay, ultimately terminates in this supreme power, and is directed
by those laws which it enacts: nor can any oaths to any foreign power whatsoever,
or any domestic subordinate power, discharge any member of the society from his
obedience to the legislative, acting pursuant to their trust; nor oblige him to any
obedience contrary to the laws so enacted, or farther than they do allow; it being
ridiculous to imagine one can be tied ultimately to obey any power in the society,
which is not the supreme.
(*The lawful power of making laws to command whole politic societies of men,
belonging so properly unto the same intire societies, that for any prince or potentate
of what kind soever upon earth, to exercise the same of himself, and not by express
commission immediately and personally received from God, or else by authority
derived at the first from their consent, upon whose persons they impose laws, it is
no better than mere tyranny. Laws they are not therefore which public approbation
hath not made so. Hooker's Eccl. Pol. l. i. sect. 10. Of this point therefore we are
to note, that sith men naturally have no full and perfect power to command whole
politic multitudes of men, therefore utterly without our consent, we could in such
sort be at no man's commandment living. And to be commanded we do consent,
when that society, whereof we be a part, hath at any time before consented,
without revoking the same after by the like universal agreement.
Laws therefore human, of what kind so ever, are available by consent. Ibid.)
Sect. 135. Though the legislative, whether placed in one or more, whether it be
always in being, or only by intervals, though it be the supreme power in every
common-wealth; yet,
First, It is not, nor can possibly be absolutely arbitrary over the lives and
fortunes of the people: for it being but the joint power of every member of the
society given up to that person, or assembly, which is legislator; it can be no more
than those persons had in a state of nature before they entered into society, and
gave up to the community: for no body can transfer to another more power than he
has in himself; and no body has an absolute arbitrary power over himself, or over
any other, to destroy his own life, or take away the life or property of another. A
man, as has been proved, cannot subject himself to the arbitrary power of another;
and having in the state of nature no arbitrary power over the life, liberty, or
possession of another, but only so much as the law of nature gave him for the
preservation of himself, and the rest of mankind; this is all he cloth, or can give up
to the common-wealth, and by it to the legislative power, so that the legisla tive
can have no more than this. Their power, in the utmost bounds of it, is limited to
the public good of the society. It is a power, that hath no other end but....
Sect. 136. Secondly,* The legislative, or supreme authority, cannot assume to its
self a power to rule by extemporary arbitrary decrees, but is bound to dispense
justice, and decide the rights of the subject by promulgated standing laws, and
known authorized judges: for the law of nature being unwritten, and so no where
to be found but in the minds of men, they who through passion or interest shall
miscite, or misapply it, cannot so easily be convinced of their mistake where there
is no established judge: and so it serves not, as it ought, to determine the rights, and
fence the properties of those that live under it, especially where every one is judge,
interpreter, and executioner of it too, and that in his own case: and he that has right
on his side, having ordinarily but his own single strength, hath not force enough to
defend himself from injuries, or to punish delinquents. To avoid these
inconveniences, which disorder men's properties in the state of nature, men unite
into societies, that they may have the united strength of the whole society to secure
and defend their properties.....
Sect. 138. Thirdly, The supreme power cannot take from any man any part of his
property without his own consent: for the preservation of property being the end of
government, and that for which men ente r into society, it necessarily supposes and
requires, that the people should have property, without which they must be
supposed to lose that, by entering into society, which was the end for which they
entered into it; too gross an absurdity for a ny man to own. Men therefore in
society having property, they have such a right to the goods, which by the law of
the community are their's, that no body hath a right to take their substance or any
part of it from them, without their o wn consent: without this they have no property
at all; for I have truly no property in that, which another can by right take from me,
when he pleases, against my consent....
Sect. 141. Fourthly, The legislative cannot transfer the power of making laws to
any other hands: for it being but a delegated power from the people, they who have
it cannot pass it over to others. The people alone can appoint the form of the
common-wealth, which is by constituting the legislative, and appointing in whose
hands that shall be. And when the people have said, We will submit to rules, and be
governed by laws made by such men, and in such forms, no body else can say
other men shall make laws for them; nor can the people be bound by any laws, but
such as are enacted by those whom they have chosen, and authorized to make laws
for them. The power of the legislative, being derived from the people by a positive
voluntary grant and institution, can be no other than what that positive grant
conveyed, which being only to make laws, and not to make legislators, the
legislative can ha ve no power to transfer their authority of making laws, and place
it in other hands.
CHAP. XII.
Of the Legislative, Executive, and Federative Power of the Common-wealth.
Sect. 143. THE legislative power is that, which has a right to direct how the force
of the common-wealth shall be employed for preserving the community and the
members of it. But because those laws which are con stantly to be executed, and
whose force is always to continue, may be made in a little time; therefore there is
no need, that the legislative should be always in being, not having always business
to do. And because it may be too great a temptati on to human frailty, apt to grasp
at power, for the same persons, who have the power of making laws, to have also
in their hands the power to execute them, whereby they may exempt themselves
from obedience to the laws they make, and suit the law, both in its making, and
execution, to their own private advantage, and thereby come to have a distinct
interest from the rest of the community, contrary to the end of society and
government: therefore in well ordered commonwealths, where the good of the
whole is so considered, as it ought, the legislative power is put into the hands of
divers persons, who duly assembled, have by themselves, or jointly with others, a
power to make laws, which when they have done, being separated again, they are
themselves subject to the laws they have made; which is a new and near tie upon
them, to take care, that they make them for the public good.
Sect. 144. But because the laws, that are at once, and in a short time made, have a
constant and lasting force, and need a perpetual execution, or an attendance
thereunto; therefore it is necessary there should be a power always in being, which
should see to the execution of the laws tha t are made, and remain in force. And
thus the legislative and executive power come often to be separated.
Sect. 145. There is another power in every common-wealth, which one may call
natural, because it is that which answers to the power every man naturally had
before he entered into society: for though in a common-w ealth the members of it
are distinct persons still in reference to one another, and as such as governed by the
laws of the society; yet in reference to the rest of mankind, they make one body,
which is, as every member of it before was, still in the state of nature with the rest
of mankind. Hence it is, that the controversies that happen between any man of the
society with those that are out of it, are managed by the public; and an injury done
to a member of their body, engages the whole in the reparatio n of it. So that under
this consideration, the whole community is one body in the state of nature, in
respect of all other states or persons out of its community.
Sect. 146. This therefore contains the power of war and peace, leagues and
alliances, and all the transactions, with all persons and communities without the
common-wealth, and may be called federative, if any one pleases. So the thing be
understood, I am indifferent as to the name.
Sect. 147. These two powers, executive and federative, though they be really
distinct in themselves, yet one comprehending the execution of the municipal laws
of the society within its self, upo n all that are parts of it; the other the management
of the security and interest of the public without, with all those that it may receive
benefit or damage from, yet they are always almost united. And though this
federative power in the well or ill management of it be of great moment to the
common-wealth, yet it is much less capable to be directed by antecedent, standing,
positive laws, than the executive; and so must necessarily be left to the prudence
and wisdom of those, w hose hands it is in, to be managed for the public good: for
the laws that concern subjects one amongst another, being to direct their actions,
may well enough precede them. But what is to be done in reference to foreigners,
dep ending much upon their actions, and the variation of designs and interests, must
be left in great part to the prudence of those, who have this power committed to
them, to be managed by the best of their skill, for the advantage of the
common-wealth.
Sect. 148. Though, as I said, the executive and federative power of every
community be really distinct in themselves, yet they are hardly to be separated, and
placed at the same time, in the hands of distinct per sons: for both of them requiring
the force of the society for their exercise, it is almost impracticable to place the
force of the common-wealth in distinct, and not subordinate hands; or that the
executive and federative power should be placed in persons, that might act
separately, whereby the force of the public would be under different commands:
which would be apt some time or other to cause disorder and ruin.
Sect. 202. Where-ever law ends, tyranny begins, if the law be transgressed to
another's harm; and whosoever in authority exceeds the power given him by the
law, and makes use of the force he has under his command, to compass that upon
the subject, which the law allows not, ceases in that to be a magistrate; and, acting
without authority, may be opposed, as any other man, who by force invades the
right of another. This is acknowledged in subordinate magistrates. He that hath
authority to seize my person in the street, may be opposed as a thief and a robber,
if he endeavours to break into my house to execute a writ, notwithstanding that I
know he has such a warrant, and such a legal authority, as will impower him to
arrest me abroad. And why this should not hold in the highest, as well as in the
most inferior magistrate, I would gladly be informed. Is it reasonable, that the eldest
brother, because he has the greatest part of his father's estate, should thereby have
a right to take away any of his younger brothers portions? or that a rich man, who
possessed a whole country, should from thence have a right to seize, when he
pleased, the cottage and garden of his poor neighbour? The being rightfully
possessed of great power and riches, exceedingly beyond the greatest part of the
sons of Adam, is so far from being an excuse, much less a reason, for rapine and
oppression, which the endamaging another without authority is, that it is a great
aggravation of it: for the exceeding the bounds of authority is no more a right in a
great, than in a petty officer; no more justifiable in a king than a constable; but is so
much the worse in him, in that he has more trust put in him, has already a much
greater share than the rest of his brethren, and is supposed, from the advantages of
his education, employment, and counselors, to be more knowing in the measures
of right and wrong.
Sect. 203. May the commands then of a prince be opposed? may he be resisted as
often as any one shall find himself aggrieved, and but imagine he has not right done
him? This will unhinge and overturn all polities , and, instead of government and
order, leave nothing but anarchy and confusion.
Sect. 204. To this I answer, that force is to be opposed to nothing, but to unjust
and unlawful force; whoever makes any opposition in any other case, draws on
himself a just condemnation both from God an d man; and so no such danger or
confusion will follow, as is often suggested:....Sect. 229. The end of government is the good of mankind; and which is best for
mankind, that the people should be always exposed to the boundless will of
tyranny, or that the rulers should be sometimes liable to be opposed, when they
grow exorbitant in the use of their power, and employ it for the destruction, and not
the preservation of the properties of their people?
Sect. 223. To this perhaps it will be said, that the people being ignorant, and always
discontented, to lay the foundation of government in the unsteady opinion and
uncertain humour of the people, is to expose it to certain ruin; and no government
will be able long to subsist, if the people may set up a new legislative, whenever
they take offence at the old one. To this I answer, Quite the contrary. People are
not so easily got out of their old forms, as some are apt to suggest. They are hardly
to be prevailed with to amend the acknowledged faults in the frame they have been
accustomed to. And if there be any original defects, or adventitious ones introduced
by time, or corruption; it is not an easy thing to get them changed, even when all
the world sees there is an opportunity for it. This slowness and aversion in the
people to quit their old constitutions, has, in the many revolutions which have been
seen in this kingdom, in this and former ages, still kept us to, or, after some interval
of fruitless attempts, still brought us back again to our old legislative of king, lords
and commons: and whatever provocations have made the crown be taken from
some of our princes heads, they never carried the people so far as to place it in
another line.
Sect. 224. But it will be said, this hypothesis lays a ferment for frequent rebellion.
To which I answer,
First, No more than any other hypothesis: for when the people are made
miserable, and find themselves exposed to the ill usage of arbitrary power, cry up
their governors, as much as you will, for sons of Jupiter; let them be sacred and
divine, descended, or authorized from heaven; give them out for whom or what
you please, the same will happen. The people generally ill treated, and contrary to
right, will be ready upon any occasion to ease themselves of a burden that sits
heavy upon them. They will wish, and seek for the opportunity, which in the
change, weakness and accidents of human affairs, seldom delays long to offer itself.
He must have lived but a little while in the world, who has not seen examples of
this in his time; and he must have read very little, who cannot produce examples of
it in all sorts of governments in the world.
Sec. 225. Secondly, I answer, such revolutions happen not upon every little
mismanagement in public affairs. Great mistakes in the ruling part, many wrong
and inconvenient laws, and all the slips of human frailty, will be born by the people
without mutiny or murmur. But if a long train of abuses, prevarications and
artifices, all tending the same way, make the design visible to the people, and they
cannot but feel what they lie under, and see whither they are going; it is not to be
wondered, that they should then rouze themselves, and endeavour to put the rule
into such hands which may secure to them the ends for which government was at
first erected; and without which, ancient names, and specious forms, are so far
from being better, that they are much worse, than the state of nature, or pure
anarchy; the inconveniencies being all as great and as near, but the remedy farther
off and more difficult.
Sect. 226. Thirdly, I answer, that this doctrine of a power in the people of
providing for their safety a-new, by a new legislative, when their legislators have
acted contrary to their trust, by invading their property, is the best fence against
rebellion, and the probablest means to hinder it: for rebellion being an opposition,
not to persons, but authority, which is founded only in the constitutions and laws of
the government; those, whoever they be, who by force break through, and by force
justify their violation of them, are truly and properly rebels: for when men, by
entering into society and civil-government, have excluded force, and introduced
laws for the preservation of property, peace, and unity amongst themselves, those
who set up force again in opposition to the laws, do rebellare, that is, bring back
again the state of war, and are properly rebels: which they who are in power, (by
the pretence they have to authority, the temptation of force they have in their
hands, and the flattery of those about them) being likeliest to do; the properest way
to prevent the evil, is to shew them the danger and injustice of it, who are under the
greatest temptation to run into it.
Sect. 229. The end of government is the good of mankind; and which is best for
mankind, that the people should be always exposed to the boundless will of
tyranny, or that the rulers should be sometimes liable to be opposed, when they
grow exorbitant in the use of their power, and employ it for the destruction, and not
the preservation of the properties of their people?